# Bridging the Gap Between Fair Simulation and Trace Inclusion 

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#### Abstract

The paper considers the problem of checking abstraction between two finite-state fair discrete systems. In automata-theoretic terms this is trace inclusion between two Streett automata. We propose to reduce this problem to an algorithm for checking fair simulation between two generalized Büchi automata. For solving this question we present a new triply nested $\mu$-calculus formula which can be implemented by symbolic methods.

We then show that every trace inclusion of this type can be solved by fair simulation, provided we augment the concrete system (the contained automaton) by appropriate auxiliary variables. This establishes that fair simulation offers a complete method for checking trace inclusion.

We illustrate the feasibility of the approach by algorithmically checking abstraction between systems whose abstraction could only be verified by deductive methods up to now.


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## 1 Introduction

A frequently occurring problem in verifi cation of reactive systems is the problem of abstraction (symmetrically refinement) in which we are given a concrete reactive system $C$ and an abstract reactive system $A$ and are asked to check whether $A$ abstracts $C$, denoted $C \sqsubseteq A$. In the linear-semantics framework this question calls for checking whether any observation of $C$ is also an observation of $A$. For the case that both $C$ and $A$ are fi nite-state systems which admit both weak and strong fairness this problem can be reduced to the problem of language inclusion between two Streett automata (e.g., [Var91]).

In theory, this problem has an exponential-time algorithmic solution based on the complementation of the automaton representing the abstract system $A$ [Saf92]. However, the complexity of this algorithm makes its application prohibitively expensive. For example, our own interest in the fi nite-state abstraction problem stems from applications of the verifi cation method of network invariants ([KPSZ02],[WL89]). In a typical application of this method, we are asked to verify the abstraction $P_{1}\left\|P_{2}\right\| P_{3}\left\|P_{4} \sqsubseteq P_{5}\right\| P_{6} \| P_{7}$, claiming that 3 parallel copies of the dining philosophers process abstract a system of 4 parallel copies of the same process. The system on the right has about 1800 states. Obviously, to complement a Streett automaton of 1800 states is hopelessly expensive.

A partial but more effective solution to the problem of checking abstraction between systems (trace inclusion between automata) is provided by the notion of simulation. Introduced fi rst by Milner [Mil71], we say that system $A$ simulates system $C$, denoted $C \preceq A$, if there exists a simulation relation $R$ between the states of $C$ and the states of $A$. It is required that if $\left(s_{C}, s_{A}\right) \in R$ and system $C$ can move from state $s_{C}$ to state $s_{C}^{\prime}$, then system $A$ can move from $s_{A}$ to some $s_{A}^{\prime}$ such that $\left(s_{C}^{\prime}, s_{A}^{\prime}\right) \in R$. Additional requirements on $R$ are that if $\left(s_{C}, s_{A}\right) \in R$ then $s_{C}$ and $s_{A}$ agree on the values of their observables, and for every $s_{C}$ initial in $C$ there exists $s_{A}$ initial in $A$ such that $\left(s_{C}, s_{A}\right) \in R$. It is obvious that $C \preceq A$ is a suffi cient condition for $C \sqsubseteq A$. For fi nite-state systems, we can check $C \preceq A$ in time proportional to $\left(\left|\Sigma_{C}\right| \cdot\left|\Sigma_{A}\right|\right)^{2}$ where $\Sigma_{C}$ and $\Sigma_{A}$ are the sets of states of $A$ and $C$ respectively [BR96, HHK95].

While being a suffi cient condition, simulation is defi nitely not a necessary condition for abstraction. This is illustrated by the two systems presented in Fig. 1


Figure 1: Systems EARLY and LATE
The labels in these two systems consist of a local state name (a-e, A-E) and an observable value. Clearly these two systems are (observation)-equivalent because they each have the two possible observations $012^{\omega}+$ $013^{\omega}$. Thus, each of them abstracts the other. However, when we examine their simulation relation, we fi nd that EARLY $\preceq ~ L A T E ~ b u t ~ L A T E ~ \preceq ~ E A R L Y . ~ T h i s ~ e x a m p l e ~ i l l u s t r a t e s ~ t h a t, ~ i n ~ s o m e ~ c a s e s ~ w e ~ c a n ~ u s e ~ s i m u l a t i o n ~$ in order to establish abstraction (trace inclusion) but this method is not complete.

The above discussion only covered the case that $C$ and $A$ did not have any fairness requirements associated with them. There were many suggestions about how to enhance the notion of simulation in order to account for fairness [GL94, LT87, HKR97, HR00]. The one we found most useful for our purposes is the defi nition of fair simulation from [HKR97]. Henzinger et al. proposed a game-based view of simulation. As in the unfair case, the defi nition assumes an underlying simulation relation $R$ which implies equality
of the observables. However, in the presence of fairness, it is not suffi cient to guarantee that every step of the concrete system can be matched by an abstract step with corresponding observables. Here we require that the abstract system has a strategy such that any joint run of the two systems, where the abstract player follows this strategy will either satisfy the fairness requirements of the abstract system or fail to satisfy one of the fairness requirements of the concrete system. This guarantees that every concrete observation has a corresponding abstract observation with matching values of the observables.

## Algorithmic Considerations

In order to determine whether one system fairly simulates another (solve fair simulation) we have to solve games [HKR97]. When the two systems in question are reactive systems with strong fairness (Streett), the winning condition of the resulting game is an implication between two Streett conditions (fsim-games). In [HKR97] the solution of fsim-games is reduced to the solution of Streett games. In [KV98] an algorithm for solving Streett games is presented. The time complexity of this approach is $\left(\left|\Sigma_{A}\right| \cdot\left|\Sigma_{C}\right| \cdot\left(3^{k_{A}}+k_{C}\right)\right)^{2 k_{A}+k_{C}}$. $\left(2 k_{A}+k_{C}\right)$ ! where $k_{C}$ and $k_{A}$ denote the number of Streett pairs of $C$ and $A$ respectively. Obviously, the complexity of this approach is too high. It is also not obvious whether this algorithm can be transformed into a symbolic one.

In the context of fair simulation, Streett systems cannot be reduced to simpler systems [KPV00]. That is, in order to solve the question of fair simulation between Streett systems we have to solve fsim-games in their full generality. However, we are only interested in fair simulation as a precondition for trace inclusion. In the context of trace inclusion we can reduce the problem of two reactive systems with strong fairness to an equivalent problem with weak fairness. Formally, for the reactive systems $C$ and $A$ with Streett fairness requirements, we construct $C^{B}$ and $A^{B}$ with generalized Büchi requirements, such that $C \sqsubseteq A$ iff $C^{B} \sqsubseteq A^{B}$. Solving fair simulation between $C^{B}$ and $A^{B}$ is simpler. The winning condition of the resulting game is an implication between two generalized Büchi conditions (generalized Streett[1]).

In [dAHM01], a solution for games with winning condition expressed as a general LTL formula is presented. The algorithm in [dAHM01] constructs a deterministic parity word automaton for the winning condition. The automaton is then converted into a $\mu$-calculus formula that evaluates the set of winning states for the relevant player.

In [EL86], Emerson and Lei show that a $\mu$-calculus formula is in fact a recipe for symbolic model checking ${ }^{1}$. The main factor in the complexity of $\mu$-calculus model checking is the alternation depth of the formula. The symbolic algorithm for model checking a $\mu$-calculus formula of alternation depth $k$ takes time proportional to $(m n)^{k}$ where $m$ is the size of the formula and $n$ is the size of the model [EL86].

In fsim-games the winning condition is an implication between two Streett conditions. A deterministic Streett automaton for such a winning condition has $3{ }^{k_{A}} \cdot k_{C}$ states and index $2 k_{A}+k_{C}$. A deterministic parity automaton for the same condition has $3^{k} \cdot k_{C} \cdot\left(2 k_{A}+k_{C}\right)$ ! states and index $4 k_{A}+2 k_{C}$. The $\mu$-calculus formula constructed by [dAHM01] is thus of alternation depth $4 k_{C}+2 k_{C}$ and its size is proportional to $3^{k} \cdot k_{C} \cdot\left(2 k_{C}+k_{C}\right)$ !. We can therefore conclude that, in the case of fsim-games, there is no advantage in using [dAHM01].

In the case of generalized Streett[1] games, a deterministic parity automaton for the winning condition has $\left|J_{C}\right| \cdot\left|J_{A}\right|$ states and index 3 , where $\left|J_{C}\right|$ and $\left|J_{A}\right|$ denote the number of Büchi sets in the fairness of $C^{B}$ and $A^{B}$ respectively. The $\mu$-calculus formula of [dAHM01] is proportional to $3\left|J_{C}\right| \cdot\left|J_{A}\right|$ and has alternation depth 3.

We present an alternative $\mu$-calculus formula for solving generalized Streett[1] games. Our formula is also of alternation depth 3 but its length is proportional to $2\left|J_{C}\right| \cdot\left|J_{A}\right|$ and it is simpler than that of [dAHM01].

[^1]Obviously, our algorithm is tailored for the case of generalized-Streett[1] games while [dAHM01] give a generic solution for any LTL game ${ }^{2}$. The time complexity of solving fair simulation between two reactive systems after converting them to systems with generalized Büchi fairness requirements is $\left(\left|\Sigma_{A}\right| \cdot\left|\Sigma_{C}\right| \cdot\right.$ $\left.2^{k_{A}+k_{C}} \cdot\left(\left|J_{A}\right|+\left|J_{C}\right|+k_{A}+k_{C}\right)\right)^{3}$.

## Making the Method Complete

Even if we succeed to present a complexity-acceptable algorithm for checking fair simulation between generalized-Büchi systems, there is still a major drawback to this approach which is its incompleteness. As shown by the example of Fig. 1, there are (trivially simple) systems $C$ and $A$ such that $C \sqsubseteq A$ but this abstraction cannot be proven using fair simulation. Fortunately, we are not the first to be concerned by the incompleteness of simulation as a method for proving abstraction. In the context of infi nite-state system verifi cation, Abadi and Lamport studied the method of simulation using an abstraction mapping [AL91]. It is not diffi cult to see that this notion of simulation is the infi nite-state counterpart of the fair simulation as defi ned in [HKR97] but restricted to the use of memory-less strategies. However, [AL91] did not stop there but proceeded to show that if we are allowed to add to the concrete system auxiliary history and prophecy variables, then the simulation method becomes complete. That is, with appropriate augmentation by auxiliary variables, every abstraction relation can be proven using fair simulation. History variables remove the restriction to memory-less strategies, while prophecy variables allow to predict the future and use fair simulation to establish, for example, the abstraction LATE $\sqsubseteq ~ E A R L Y . ~$

The application of Abadi-Lamport, being deductive in nature, requires the users to decide on the appropriate history and prophecy variables, and then design their abstraction mapping which makes use of these auxiliary variables. Implementing these ideas in the fi nite-state (and therefore algorithmic) world, we expect the strategy (corresponding to the abstraction mapping) to be computed fully automatically. Thus, in our implementation, the user is still expected to identify the necessary auxiliary history or prophecy variables, but following that, the rest of the process is automatic. For example, wishing to apply our algorithm in order to check the abstraction LATE $\sqsubseteq$ EARLY, the user has to specify the augmentation of the concrete system by a temporal tester for the LTL formula $\diamond(x=2)$. Using this augmentation, the algorithm manages to prove that the augmented system (LATE +tester) is fairly simulated (hence abstracted) by EARLY.

In summary, the contributions of this paper are:

1. Showing how to reduce the problem of checking fair simulation between two reactive systems (Streett automata) into a game with generalized-Street[1] acceptance condition.
2. Providing a new (and more effi cient) $\mu$-calculus formula and its implementation by symbolic modelchecking tools for solving the fair simulation between two reactive systems.
3. Claiming and demonstrating the completeness of the fair-simulation method for proving abstraction between two systems, at the price of augmenting the concrete system by appropriately chosen "observers" and "testers".

## 2 The Computational Model

As a computational model, we take the model of fair discrete system (FDS) [KP00]. An FDS $\mathcal{D}:\langle V, \mathcal{O}, \Theta, \rho, \mathcal{J}, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ consists of the following components.

[^2]- $V=\left\{u_{1}, \ldots, u_{n}\right\}$ : A fin nite set of typed state variables over possibly infi nite domains. We defi ne a state $s$ to be a type-consistent interpretation of $V$, assigning to each variable $u \in V$ a value $s[u]$ in its domain. We denote by $\Sigma$ the set of all states. In this paper we assume that $\Sigma$ is fin nite.
- $\mathcal{O} \subseteq V$ : A subset of observable variables. These are the variables which can be externally observed.
- $\Theta$ : The initial condition. This is an assertion characterizing all the initial states of the FDS. A state is called initial if it satisfi es $\Theta$.
- $\rho$ : A transition relation. This is an assertion $\rho\left(V, V^{\prime}\right)$, relating a state $s \in \Sigma$ to its $\mathcal{D}$-successor $s^{\prime} \in \Sigma$ by referring to both unprimed and primed versions of the state variables. The transition relation $\rho\left(V, V^{\prime}\right)$ identifi es state $s^{\prime}$ as a $\mathcal{D}$-successor of state $s$ if $\left\langle s, s^{\prime}\right\rangle \models \rho\left(V, V^{\prime}\right)$, where $\left\langle s, s^{\prime}\right\rangle$ is the joint interpretation which interprets $x \in V$ as $s[x]$, and $x^{\prime}$ as $s^{\prime}[x]$.
- $\mathcal{J}=\left\{J_{1}, \ldots, J_{k}\right\}$ : A set of assertions expressing the justice (weak fairness) requirements. Intentionally, the justice requirement $J \in \mathcal{J}$ stipulates that every computation contains infi nitely many $J$-states (states satisfying $J$ ).
- $\mathcal{C}=\left\{\left\langle p_{1}, q_{1}\right\rangle, \ldots\left\langle p_{n}, q_{n}\right\rangle\right\}$ : A set of assertions expressing the compassion (strong fairness) requirements. Intentionally, the compassion requirement $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{C}$ stipulates that every computation containing infi nitely many $p$-states also contains infi nitely many $q$-states.

We require that every state $s \in \Sigma$ has at least one $\mathcal{D}$-successor. This is ensured by including in $\rho$ the idling disjunct $V^{\prime}=V$ (also called the stuttering step).
Let $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$, be a sequence of states, $\varphi$ be an assertion, and $j \geq 0$ be a natural number. We say that $j$ is a $\varphi$-position of $\sigma$ if $s_{j}$ is a $\varphi$-state. Let $\mathcal{D}$ be an FDS for which the above components have been identifi ed. We defi ne a run of $\mathcal{D}$ to be an infi nite sequence of states $\sigma:$ © , $s_{1}, \ldots$, satisfying the requirements of

- Initiality: $\quad s_{0}$ is initial, i.e., $s_{0} \mid=\Theta$.
- Consecution: For each $j=0,1, \ldots$, the state $s_{j+1}$ is a $\mathcal{D}$-successor of the state $s_{j}$.

We denote by $\operatorname{runs}(\mathcal{D})$ the set of runs of $\mathcal{D}$. A run of $\mathcal{D}$ is called a computation if it satisfi es the following:

- Justice: $\quad$ For each $J \in \mathcal{J}, \sigma$ contains infi nitely many $J$-positions
- Compassion: For each $\langle p, q\rangle \in \mathcal{C}$, if $\sigma$ contains infi nitely many $p$-positions, it must also contain infi nitely many $q$-positions.
We denote by $\operatorname{Comp}(\mathcal{D})$ the set of all computations of $\mathcal{D}$.
Systems $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$ are compatible if the intersection of their variables is observable in both systems. For compatible systems $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$, we defi ne their asynchronous parallel composition, denoted by $\mathcal{D}_{1} \| \mathcal{D}_{2}$, as the FDS whose sets of variables, observable variables, justice, and compassion sets are the unions of the corresponding sets in the two systems, whose initial condition is the conjunction of the initial conditions, and whose transition relation is the disjunction of the two transition relations. Thus, the execution of the combined system is the interleaved execution of $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$.

For compatible systems $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$, we defi ne their synchronous parallel composition, denoted by $\mathcal{D}_{1} \| \mid \mathcal{D}_{2}$, as the FDS whose sets of variables and initial condition are defi ned similarly to the asynchronous composition, and whose transition relation is the conjunction of the two transition relations. Thus, a step in an execution of the combined system is a joint step of systems $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$. The primary use of synchronous composition is for combining a system with a tester $T_{\varphi}$ for an LTL formula $\varphi$.

The observations of $\mathcal{D}$ are the projection $\mathcal{D} \Downarrow_{\mathcal{O}}$ of $\mathcal{D}$-computations onto $\mathcal{O}$. We denote by $\operatorname{Obs}(\mathcal{D})$ the set of all observations of $\mathcal{D}$. Systems $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ are said to be comparable if there is a one to one correspondence between their observable variables. System $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ is said to be an abstraction of the comparable system
$\mathcal{D}_{C}$, denoted $\mathcal{D}_{C} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_{A}$, if $\operatorname{Obs}\left(\mathcal{D}_{C}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Obs}\left(\mathcal{D}_{A}\right)$. The abstraction relation is reflexive and transitive. It is also property restricting. That is, if $\mathcal{D}_{C} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_{A}$ then $\mathcal{D}_{A} \models p$ implies that $\mathcal{D}_{C} \models p$ for an LTL property $p$. We say that two comparable FDS's $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$ are equivalent, denoted $\mathcal{D}_{1} \sim \mathcal{D}_{2}$ if $\operatorname{Obs}\left(\mathcal{D}_{1}\right)=\operatorname{Obs}\left(\mathcal{D}_{2}\right)$. For compatibility with automata terminology, we refer to the observations of $\mathcal{D}$ also as the traces of $\mathcal{D}$.

All our concrete examples are given in SPL (Simple Programming Language), which is used to represent concurrent programs (e.g., [MP95, MAB ${ }^{+94] \text { ). Every SPL program can be compiled into an FDS in a }}$ straightforward manner. In particular, every statement in an SPL program contributes a disjunct to the transition relation. For example, the assignment statement " $\ell_{0}: y:=x+1 ; \ell_{1}:$ " contributes to $\rho$ the disjunct

$$
\rho_{\ell_{0}}: \quad a t_{-} \ell_{0} \wedge a t_{-}^{\prime} \ell_{1} \wedge y^{\prime}=x+1 \wedge x^{\prime}=x .
$$

The predicates $a t_{-} \ell_{0}$ and $a t_{-}^{\prime} \ell_{1}$ stand, respectively, for the assertions $\pi_{i}=0$ and $\pi_{i}^{\prime}=1$, where $\pi_{i}$ is the control variable denoting the current location within the process to which the statement belongs.

## From fDS to JDS

An FDS with no compassion requirements is called a just discrete system (JDS).
Let $\mathcal{D}:\langle V, \mathcal{O}, \Theta, \rho, \mathcal{J}, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ be an FDS such that $\mathcal{C}=\left\{\left(p_{1}, q_{1}\right), \ldots,\left(p_{m}, q_{m}\right)\right\}$ and $m>0$. We defi ne a JDS $\mathcal{D}^{B}:\left\langle V^{B}, \mathcal{O}^{B}, \Theta^{B}, \rho^{B}, \mathcal{J}^{B}, \emptyset\right\rangle$ equivalent to $\mathcal{D}$, as follows:

- $V^{B}=V \cup\left\{n_{-} p_{i}\right.$ : boolean $\left.\mid\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}\right\} \cup\left\{x_{c}\right\}$. That is, for every compassion requirement $\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}$, we add to $V^{B}$ a boolean variable $n_{-} p_{i}$. Variable $n_{-} p_{i}$ is a prediction variable intended to turn true at a point in a computation from which the assertion $p_{i}$ remains false forever. Variable $x_{c}$, common to all compassion requirements, is intended to turn true at a point in a computation satisfying $\bigvee_{i=1}^{m}\left(p_{i} \wedge n_{\_} p_{i}\right)$, which indicates an instance of mis-prediction.
- $\mathcal{O}^{B}=\mathcal{O}$.
- $\Theta^{B}=\Theta \wedge x_{c}=0 \wedge \bigwedge_{\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}} n_{-} p_{i}=0$.

That is, initially all the newly introduced boolean variables are set to zero.

- $\rho^{B}=\rho \wedge \rho_{n_{-} p} \wedge \rho_{c}$, where

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\rho_{n_{-} p}: & \bigwedge_{\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}}\left(n_{-} p_{i} \rightarrow n-p_{i}^{\prime}\right) \\
\rho_{c} & : x_{c}^{\prime}=\left(\begin{array}{lll}
\left.x_{c} \vee \bigvee_{\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}}\left(p_{i} \wedge n_{-} p_{i}\right)\right)
\end{array}\right)
\end{array}
$$

The augmented transition relation allows each of the $n p_{i}$ variables to change non-deterministically from 0 to 1 . Variable $x_{c}$ is set to 1 on the first occurrence of $p_{i} \wedge n_{-} p_{i}$, for some $i, 1 \leq i \leq m$. Once set, it is never reset.

- $\mathcal{J}^{B}=\mathcal{J} \cup\left\{\neg x_{c}\right\} \cup\left\{n_{-} p_{i} \vee q_{i} \mid\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}\right\}$.

The augmented justice set contains the additional justice requirement $n p_{i} \vee q_{i}$ for each $\left(p_{i}, q_{i}\right) \in \mathcal{C}$. This requirement demands that either $n p_{i}$ turns true sometime, implying that $p_{i}$ is continuously false from that time on, or $q_{i}$ holds infi nitely often.
The justice requirement $\neg x_{c}$ ensures that a run with one of the variables $n \_p_{i}$ set prematurely, will not be accepted as a computation.

The transformation of an FDS to a JDS follows the transformation of Streett automata to generalized Büchi Automata (see [Cho74] for fi nite state automata and [Var91] for infi nite state automata).

## 3 Simulation Games

Let $\mathcal{D}_{C}:\left\langle V_{C}, \mathcal{O}_{C}, \Theta_{C}, \rho_{C}, \mathcal{J}_{C}, \mathcal{C}_{C}\right\rangle$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}:\left\langle V_{A}, \mathcal{O}_{A}, \Theta_{A}, \rho_{A}, \mathcal{J}_{A}, \mathcal{C}_{A}\right\rangle$ be two comparable FDS's. We denote by $\Sigma_{C}$ and $\Sigma_{A}$ the sets of states of $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ respectively. We defi ne the simulation game structure (SGS) associated with $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ to be the tuple $G:\left\langle\mathcal{D}_{C}, \mathcal{D}_{A}\right\rangle$. A state of $G$ is a type-consistent interpretation of the variables in $V_{C} \cup V_{A}$. We denote by $\Sigma_{G}$ the set of states of $G$. We say that a state $s \in \Sigma_{G}$ is a correlated state, if $s\left[\mathcal{O}_{C}\right]=s\left[\mathcal{O}_{A}\right]$. We denote by $\Sigma_{\text {cor }} \subset \Sigma_{G}$ the subset of correlated states of $G$.

For two states $s$ and $t$ we say that $t$ is an $A$-successor of $s$ if $(s, t) \models \rho_{A}$ and $s\left[V_{C}\right]=t\left[V_{C}\right]$. Similarly, we say that $t$ is a $C$-successor of $s$ if $(s, t) \models \rho_{C}$ and $s\left[V_{A}\right]=t\left[V_{A}\right]$. A run of $G$ is a maximal sequence of states $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ satisfying the following:

- Consecution: For each $j=0, \ldots$,
- $C$-consecution: $s_{2 j+1}$ is a $C$-successor of $s_{2 j}$.
- $A$-consecution: $s_{2 j+2}$ is a $A$-successor of $s_{2 j+1}$.
- Correlation: For each $j=0, \ldots$,

$$
s_{2 j} \in \Sigma_{c o r}
$$

We say that a run is initialized if it satisfi es

- Initiality: $\quad s_{0}=\Theta_{A} \wedge \Theta_{C}$

Let $G$ be an SGS and $\sigma$ be a run of $G$. The run $\sigma$ can be viewed as a two player game. Player $C$, represented by $\mathcal{D}_{C}$, taking $\rho_{C}$ transitions from even numbered states and player $A$, represented by $\mathcal{D}_{A}$, taking $\rho_{A}$ transitions from odd numbered states. The observations of the two players are correlated on all even numbered states of a run.

A run $\sigma$ is winning for player $A$ if it is infi nite and either $\sigma \Downarrow_{V_{C}}$ is not a computation of $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ or $\sigma \Downarrow_{V_{A}}$ is a computation of $\mathcal{D}_{A}$, namely if

$$
\sigma \models \mathcal{F}_{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{F}_{A}
$$

where for $\eta \in\{A, C\}$,

$$
\mathcal{F}_{\eta}: \bigwedge_{J \in \mathcal{J}_{\eta}} \square \diamond J \wedge \bigwedge_{(p, q) \in \mathcal{C}_{\eta}}(\square \diamond p \rightarrow \square \diamond q)
$$

Otherwise, $\sigma$ is winning for player $C$.
Let $D$ be some fi nite domain, intended to record facts about the past history of a computation (serve as a memory). A strategy for player $A$ is a partial function $f_{A}: D \times \Sigma_{c o r} \times \Sigma_{G} \mapsto D \times \Sigma_{c o r}$ such that if $f_{A}\left(d, s, s^{\prime}\right)=\left(d^{\prime}, t\right)$ then $t$ is an $A$-successor of $s^{\prime}$. A strategy for player $C$ is a partial function $f_{C}: D \times \Sigma_{\text {cor }} \mapsto \Sigma_{G}$ such that if $f_{C}(d, s)=\left(d^{\prime}, s^{\prime}\right)$ then $s^{\prime}$ is a $C$-successor of $s$. Let $f_{A}$ be a strategy for player $A$, and $s_{0} \in \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. A run $s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ is said to be compliant with strategy $f_{A}$ if there exists a sequence of $D$-values $d_{0}, d_{2}, \ldots, d_{2 j}, \ldots$ such that $\left(d_{2 j+2}, s_{2 j+2}\right)=f_{A}\left(d_{2 j}, s_{2 j}, s_{2 j+1}\right)$ for every $j \geq 0$. Strategy $f_{A}$ is winning for player $A$ from state $s \in \Sigma_{c o r}$ if all $s$-runs (runs departing from $s$ ) which are compliant with $f_{A}$ are winning for $A$. A winning strategy for player $C$ is defi ned similarly. We denote by $W_{A}$ the set of states from which there exists a winning strategy for player $A$. The set $W_{C}$ is defi ned similarly.

An SGS $G$ is called determinate if the sets $W_{A}$ and $W_{C}$ defi ne a partition on $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. It is well known that every SGS is determinate [GH82].

## $3.1 \mu$-calculus

We defi ne $\mu$-calculus [Koz83] over game structures. Consider two FDS's $\mathcal{D}_{C}:\left\langle V_{C}, \mathcal{O}_{C}, \Theta_{C}, \rho_{C}, \mathcal{J}_{C}, \mathcal{C}_{C}\right\rangle$, $\mathcal{D}_{A}:\left\langle V_{A}, \mathcal{O}_{A}, \Theta_{A}, \rho_{A}, \mathcal{J}_{A}, \mathcal{C}_{A}\right\rangle$ and the SGS $G:\left\langle\mathcal{D}_{C}, \mathcal{D}_{A}\right\rangle$. For every variable $v \in V_{C} \cup V_{A}$ the formula $v=i$ where $i$ is a constant that is type consistent with $v$ is an atomic formula (p). Let $V=\{X, Y, \ldots\}$ be a set of relational variables. Each relational variable can be assigned a subset of $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. The $\mu$-calculus formulas are constructed as follows.

$$
\varphi::=p|\neg p| X|\varphi \vee \varphi| \varphi \wedge \varphi|\otimes \varphi| \mathbb{D} \varphi|\mu X \varphi| \nu X \varphi
$$

A formula $f$ is interpreted as the set of states in which $f$ is true. We write such set of states as $[[f]]_{G}^{e}$ where $G$ is the SGS and $e: V \rightarrow 2^{\Sigma_{c o r}}$ is an environment. We denote by $e[X \leftarrow S]$ the environment such that $e[X \leftarrow S](X)=S$ and $e[X \leftarrow S](Y)=e(Y)$ for $Y \neq X$. The set $[[f]]_{G}^{e}$ is defi ned inductively as follows ${ }^{3}$.

- $[[p]]_{G}^{e}=\left\{s \in \Sigma_{\text {cor }}|s|=p\right\}$
- $[[\neg p]]_{G}^{e}=\left\{s \in \Sigma_{c o r} \mid s \not \equiv p\right\}$
- $[[X]]_{G}^{e}=e(X)$
- $[[f \vee g]]_{G}^{e}=[[f]]_{G}^{e} \cup[[g]]_{G}^{e}$.
- $[[f \wedge g]]_{G}^{e}=[[f]]_{G}^{e} \cap[[g]]_{G}^{e}$.
- $[[\otimes f]]_{G}^{e}=\left\{s \in \Sigma_{\text {cor }} \mid \forall t,(s, t) \models \rho_{C} \rightarrow \exists s^{\prime},\left(t, s^{\prime}\right) \models \rho_{A}\right.$ and $\left.s^{\prime} \in[[f]]_{G}^{e}\right\}$.
- $[[(1) f]]_{G}^{e}=\left\{s \in \Sigma_{c o r} \mid \exists t,(s, t) \models \rho_{C}\right.$ and $\left.\forall s^{\prime},\left(t, s^{\prime}\right) \mid=\rho_{A} \rightarrow s^{\prime} \in[[f]]_{G}^{e}\right\}$.
- $[[\mu X f]]_{G}^{e}=\cup_{i} S_{i}$ where $S_{0}=\emptyset$ and $S_{i+1}=[[f]]_{G}^{e\left[X \leftarrow S_{i}\right]}$.
- $[[\nu X f]]_{G}^{e}=\cap_{i} S_{i}$ where $S_{0}=\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ and $S_{i+1}=[[f]]_{G}^{e\left[X \leftarrow S_{i}\right]}$

The alternation depth of a formula is the number of alternations in the nesting of least and greatest fi xpoints. A $\mu$-calculus formula defi nes a symbolic algorithm for computing $[[f]]$ [EL86]. For a $\mu$-calculus formula of alternation depth $k$, the run time of this algorithm is $\left|\Sigma_{c o r}\right|^{k}$. For a full exposition of $\mu$-calculus we refer the reader to [Eme97]. We often abuse notations and write a $\mu$-calculus formula $f$ instead of the set $[[f]]$.

## 4 Trace Inclusion and Fair Simulation

In the following, we summarize our solution to the problem of checking abstraction between two fi nite-state fair discrete systems, or equivalently, trace inclusion between two Streett automata.

Let $\mathcal{D}_{C}:\left\langle V_{C}, \mathcal{O}_{C}, \Theta_{C}, \rho_{C}, \mathcal{J}_{C}, \mathcal{C}_{C}\right\rangle$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}:\left\langle V_{A}, \mathcal{O}_{A}, \Theta_{A}, \rho_{A}, \mathcal{J}_{A}, \mathcal{C}_{A}\right\rangle$ be two comparable FDS's. We want to verify that $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ abstracts $\mathcal{D}_{C}\left(\mathcal{D}_{C} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_{A}\right)$. The best algorithm for solving abstraction is exponential [Saf92]. We therefore advocate to verify fair simulation [HKR97] as a precondition for abstraction. We adopt the defi nition of fair simulation presented in [HKR97]. Given $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$, we form the SGS $G$ : $\left\langle\mathcal{D}_{C}, \mathcal{D}_{A}\right\rangle$. We say that $S \subseteq \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ is a fair-simulation between $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ if there exists a strategy $f_{A}$ such that every $f_{A}$-compliant run $\sigma$ from a state $s \in S$ is winning for player $A$ and every even state in $\sigma$ is in $S$. We say that $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ fairly-simulates $\mathcal{D}_{C}$, denoted $\mathcal{D}_{C} \preceq_{f} \mathcal{D}_{A}$, if there exists a fair-simulation $S$ such that for every state $s_{C} \in \Sigma_{C}$ satisfying $s_{C} \models \Theta_{C}$ there exists a state $t \in S$ such that $t \Downarrow_{V_{C}}=s_{C}$ and $t \models \Theta_{A}$.

[^3]Claim 1 [HKR97] If $\mathcal{D}_{C} \preceq_{f} \mathcal{D}_{A}$ then $\mathcal{D}_{C} \sqsubseteq \mathcal{D}_{A}$. The reverse implication does not hold.
It is shown in [HKR97] that we can determine whether $\mathcal{D}_{C} \preceq_{f} \mathcal{D}_{A}$ by computing the set $W_{A} \subseteq \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ of states which are winning for $A$ in the SGS $G$. If for every state $s_{C} \in \Sigma_{c}$ satisfying $s_{C} \neq \Theta_{C}$ there exists some state $t \in \Sigma_{c o r}$ such that $t \Downarrow_{V_{C}}=s_{C}$ and $t \models \Theta_{A}$, then $\mathcal{D}_{C} \preceq_{f} \mathcal{D}_{A}$. Let $k_{C}=\left|\mathcal{C}_{C}\right|$ (number of compassion requirements of $\left.\mathcal{D}_{C}\right), k_{A}=\left|\mathcal{C}_{A}\right|, n=\left|\Sigma_{C}\right| \cdot\left|\Sigma_{A}\right| \cdot\left(3^{k_{C}}+k_{A}\right)$, and $f=2 k_{C}+k_{A}$.
Theorem 2 [HKR97, KV98] We can solve fair simulation for $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ in time $O\left(n^{2 f+1} \cdot f!\right)$.
Since we are interested in fair simulation only as a precondition for trace inclusion, we can take a more economic approach. Given two FDS's, we fi rst convert the two to JDS's using the construction in Section 2. We then solve the simulation game for the two JDS's.

Consider the FDS's $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$. Let $\mathcal{D}_{C}^{B}:\left\langle V_{C}^{B}, \mathcal{O}_{C}^{B}, \Theta_{C}^{B}, \rho_{C}^{B}, \mathcal{J}_{C}^{B}, \emptyset\right\rangle$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}^{B}:\left\langle V_{A}^{B}, \mathcal{O}_{A}^{B}, \Theta_{A}^{B}, \rho_{A}^{B}, \mathcal{J}_{A}^{B}, \emptyset\right\rangle$ be the JDS's equivalent to $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$. Consider the game $G:\left\langle\mathcal{D}_{C}^{B}, \mathcal{D}_{A}^{B}\right\rangle$, the winning condition for this game is

$$
\bigwedge_{J_{C} \in \mathcal{J}_{C}^{B}} J_{C} \rightarrow \bigwedge_{J_{A} \in \mathcal{J}_{A}^{B}} J_{A}
$$

We call such games generalized Streett[1] games.
We claim that the formula in Fig. 2 evaluates the set $W_{A}$ of states winning for player $A$. Intuitively, the greatest fixpoint $\nu X$ evaluates the set of states from which player $A$ can control the run to remain in $\neg J_{k}^{C}$ states. The least fi xpoint $\mu Y$ then evaluates the states from which player $A$ in a fi nite number of steps controls the run to avoid one of the justice conditions $J_{k}^{C}$. This represents the set $H$ of all states from which player $A$ wins as a result of the run of $\mathcal{D}_{C}^{B}$ violating justice. Finally, the outermost greatest fi xpoint $\nu Z_{j}$ adds to $H$ the states from which player $A$ can force the run to satisfy the fairness requirement of $\mathcal{D}_{A}^{B}$.

$$
\varphi=\nu\left[\begin{array}{c}
Z_{1} \\
Z_{2} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
Z_{n}
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}
\mu Y\left(\bigvee _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \nu X \left(J_{1}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{2}\right.\right. & \vee & \otimes Y & \vee & \left.\neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right) \\
\mu Y\left(\bigvee _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \nu X \left(J_{2}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{3}\right.\right. & \vee & \otimes Y & \vee & \left.\left.\neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)\right) \\
& \vdots & & \\
& \vdots & & \\
\mu Y\left(\bigvee _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \nu X \left(J_{n}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{1}\right.\right. & \vee & \otimes Y & \vee & \left.\left.\neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)\right)
\end{array}\right]
$$

Figure 2: Algorithm for solving game simulation of two JDS's
Claim $3 W_{A}=[[\varphi]]$
The proof of the claim is given in Appendix A.
Using the algorithm in [EL86] the set $[[\varphi]]$ can be evaluated symbolically.
Theorem 4 The sGS $G$ can be solved in time $O\left(\left(\left|\Sigma_{C}^{B}\right| \cdot\left|\Sigma_{A}^{B}\right| \cdot\left|\mathcal{J}_{C}^{B}\right| \cdot \mid \mathcal{J}_{A}^{B}\right)^{3}\right)$.
To summarize, in order to use fair simulation as a precondition for trace inclusion we propose to convert the FDS's into JDS's and use the formula in Fig. 2 to evaluate the winning set for player $A$.
Corollary 5 Given $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}$, we can determine whether $\mathcal{D}_{C}^{B} \preceq_{f} \mathcal{D}_{A}^{B}$ in time $O\left(\left(\left|\Sigma_{C}\right| \cdot 2^{k} C \cdot\left|\Sigma_{A}\right| \cdot 2^{k_{A}}\right.\right.$. $\left.\left.\left(k_{C}+\left|\mathcal{J}_{C}\right|+k_{A}+\left|\mathcal{J}_{A}\right|\right)\right)^{3}\right)$.

## 5 Closing the Gap

As discussed in the introduction, fair simulation implies trace inclusion but not the other way around. In [AL91], fair simulation is considered in the context of infi nite-state systems. It is easy to see that the defi nition of fair simulation given in [AL91], is the infi nite-state counterpart of fair simulation as defi ned in [HKR97], but restricted to memory-less strategies. As shown in [AL91], if we are allowed to add to the concrete system auxiliary history and prophecy variables, then the fair simulation method becomes complete for verifying trace inclusion.

Following [AL91], we allow the concrete system $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ to be augmented with a set $V_{H}$ of history variables and a set $V_{P}$ of prophecy variables. We assume that the three sets, $V_{C}, V_{H}$, and $V_{P}$, are pairwise disjoint. The result is an augmented concrete system $\mathcal{D}_{C}^{*}:\left\langle V_{C}^{*}, \Theta_{C}^{*}, \rho_{C}^{*}, \mathcal{J}_{C}, \mathcal{C}_{C}\right\rangle$, where

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V_{C}^{*}=V_{C} \cup V_{H} \cup V_{P} \\
& \Theta_{C}^{*}=\Theta_{C} \wedge \bigwedge_{x \in V_{H}}\left(x=f_{x}\left(V_{C}, V_{P}\right)\right) \\
& \rho_{C}^{*}=\rho_{C} \wedge \bigwedge_{x \in V_{H}} x^{\prime}=g_{x}\left(V_{C}^{*}, V_{C}^{\prime}, V_{P}^{\prime}\right) \wedge \bigwedge_{y \in V_{P}} y=\varphi_{y}\left(V_{C}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

In these defi nitions, each $f_{x}$ and $g_{x}$ are state functions, while each $\varphi_{y}\left(V_{C}\right)$ is a future temporal formula referring only to the variables in $V_{C}$. Thus, unlike [AL91], we use transition relations to defi ne the values of history variables, and future LTL formulas to defi ne the values of prophecy variables. The clause $y=\varphi_{y}\left(V_{C}\right)$ added to the transition relation implies that at any position $j \geq 0$, the value of the boolean variable $y$ is 1 iff the formula $\varphi_{y}\left(V_{C}\right)$ holds at this position.

It is not diffi cult to see that the augmentation scheme proposed above is non-constraining. Namely, for every computation $\sigma$ of the original concrete system $\mathcal{D}_{C}$ there exists a computation $\sigma^{*}$ of $\mathcal{D}_{C}^{*}$ such that $\sigma$ and $\sigma^{*}$ agree on the values of the variables in $V_{C}$.

Handling of the prophecy variables defi nitions is performed by constructing an appropriate temporal tester [KP00] for each of the future temporal formulas appearing in the prophecy schemes, and composing it with the concrete system.

A similar augmentation of the concrete system has been used in [KPSZO2] in a deductive proof of abstraction, based on [AL94] abstraction mapping.

Although fair simulation is verifi ed algorithmically, user intervention is still needed for choosing the appropriate temporal properties to be observed in order to ensure completeness with respect to trace inclusion.

## 6 Examples

## Late and Early

As a first example we consider the two programs EARLY and LATE presented in Fig. 3 (a graphic representation for these two programs appeared in Fig. 1). The observable variables in these two programs are $y$ and $z$. Without loss of generality, assume that the initial values of all variables are 0 . This is a well known example showing the difference between trace inclusion and simulation. Indeed, the two systems have the same set of traces. Either $y$ assumes 1 or $y$ assumes 2 . On the other hand, it is simple to see that EARLY does not simulate late. This is because we do not know whether state $\left\langle\ell_{1}, x: 0, z: 1\right\rangle$ of system Late should be mapped to state $\left\langle\ell_{1}, x: 1, z: 1\right\rangle$ or state $\left\langle\ell_{1}, x: 2, z: 1\right\rangle$ of system EARLY. Our algorithm shows that EARLY does not simulate LATE.

As mentioned early and late have the same set of traces. Hence, we should be able to augment late with history and prophecy variables that tell early how to simulate it. In this case, we add a tester $T_{\varphi}$ for the property $\varphi: \diamond(y=1)$. The tester introduces a new boolean variable $x_{\varphi}$ which is true at a state $s$ iff $s \models \varphi$. Whenever the tester for $\diamond(y=1)$ indicates that LATE will eventually choose $x=1$, EARLY can
$\operatorname{EARLY}::\left[\begin{array}{ll}\ell_{0}: & x, z:=\{1,2\}, 1 \\ \ell_{1}: & z:=2 \\ \ell_{2}: & y, z:=x, 3\end{array}\right] \quad$ LATE $\left.::\left[\begin{array}{ll}\ell_{0}: & z:=1 \\ \ell_{1}: & x, z:=\{1,2\}, 2 \\ \ell_{2}: & y, z:=x, 3\end{array}\right]\right]$

Figure 3: Programs EARLY and LATE.
safely choose $x=1$ in the first step. Whenever the tester for $\diamond(y=1)$ indicates that Late will never choose $x=1$, EARLY can safely choose $x=2$ in the first step. Denote by LATE ${ }^{+}$the combination of LATE with the tester $\diamond(y=1)$. Applying our algorithm to LATE ${ }^{+}$and EARLY, indicates that LATE ${ }^{+} \preceq_{f}$ EARLY implying that $O b s($ LATE $) \subseteq O b s($ EARLY $)$.

## Fair Discrete Modules and Open Computations

For the main application of our abstraction-checking technique, we need the notions of an open system and open computations.

We defi ne a fair discrete module (FDM) to be a system $M:\langle V, \mathcal{O}, W, \Theta, \rho, \mathcal{J}, \mathcal{C}\rangle$ consisting of the same components as an FDS plus the additional component:

- $W \subseteq V:$ A subset of owned variables. These are variables which only the system itself can modify. All other variables can also be modifi ed by steps of the environment.

An (open) computation of an FDM $M$ is an infin nite sequence $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ of $V$-states which satisfi es the requirements of initiality, justice, and compassion as any other FDS, and the requirement of consecution, reformulated as follows:

- Consecution: For each $j=0,1, \ldots$,
- $s_{2 j+1}[W]=s_{2 j}[W]$. That is, $s_{2 j+1}$ and $s_{2 j}$ agree on the interpretation of the owned variables $W$.
- $s_{2 j+2}$ is a $\rho$-successor of $s_{2 j+1}$.

Thus, an (open) computation of an FDM consists of a strict interleaving of system with environment actions, where the system action has to satisfy the transition relation $\rho$, while the environment step is only required to preserve the values of the owned variables.

Two FDM's $\mathcal{D}_{1}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{2}$ are compatible if $W_{1} \cap W_{2}=\emptyset$ and $V_{1} \cap V_{2}=O_{1} \cap O_{2}$. The asynchronous parallel composition of two compatible FDM's $M=M_{1} \| M_{2}$ is defi ned similarly to the case of composition of two FDS's where, in addition, the owned variables of the newly formed module is obtained as the union of $W_{M_{1}}$ and $W_{M_{2}}$. Module $M_{2}$ is said to be a modular abstraction of a comparable module $M_{1}$, denoted $M_{1} \sqsubseteq_{M} M_{2}$, if $\operatorname{Obs}\left(M_{1}\right) \subseteq \operatorname{Obs}\left(M_{2}\right)$. A unique feature of the modular abstraction relation is that it is compositional. This means that $M_{1} \sqsubseteq_{M} M_{2}$ implies $M_{1}\left\|M \sqsubseteq_{M} M_{2}\right\| M$. This compositionality allows us to replace a module $M_{1}$ in any context of parallel composition by another module $M_{2}$ which forms a modular abstraction of $M_{1}$ and obtain an abstraction of the complete system, which explains why we need modular abstraction for the application of the network invariants method.

It is straightforward to reduce the problem of checking modular abstraction between modules to checking abstraction between FDS's using the methods presented in this paper. This reduction is based on a transformation which, for a given FDM $M:\langle V, \mathcal{O}, W, \Theta, \rho, \mathcal{J}, \mathcal{C}\rangle$, constructs an FDS $\mathcal{D}_{M}:\langle\tilde{V}, \mathcal{O}, \widetilde{\Theta}, \widetilde{\rho}, \mathcal{J}, \mathcal{C}\rangle$, such that the set of observations of $M$ is equal to the set of observations of $\mathcal{D}_{M}$. The new components of $\mathcal{D}_{M}$ are given by:

```
\widetilde{~}}:\:V\cup{t:\mathrm{ boolean }
\widetilde { \Theta } : \Theta \wedge t
\rho}:\rho\wedge\negt\wedge\mp@subsup{t}{}{\prime}\quad\vee \operatorname{pres}(W)\wedget\wedge\neg\mp@subsup{t}{}{\prime
```

```
\(\left(Q^{n}\right)\) where
\(Q\) (left; right) :
loop forever do
\(\left.\left[\begin{array}{ll}\ell_{0}: & \text { NonCritical } \\ \ell_{1}: & \text { request left } \\ \ell_{2}: & \text { request } \text { right } \\ \ell_{3}: & \text { Critical } \\ \ell_{4}: & \text { release } \text { left } \\ \ell_{5}: & \text { release } \text { right }\end{array}\right]\right]\)
```

Figure 4: Program DINE: a chain of deterministic philosophers.
Thus, system $\mathcal{D}_{M}$ uses a fresh boolean variable $t$ to encode the turn taking between system and environment transitions.

## The Dinning Philosophers

As a second example, we consider a deterministic solution to the dinning philosophers problem (DDP). As originally described by Dijkstra, $n$ philosophers are seated at a round table, with a fork placed in between each two neighbors. Each philosopher alternates between a thinking phase and a phase in which he becomes hungry and wishes to eat. In order to eat, a philosopher needs to acquire the forks on both its sides. A solution to the problem consists of protocols to the philosophers (and, possibly, forks) that guarantees that no two adjacent philosophers eat at the same time (mutual exclusion) and that every hungry philosopher eventually gets to eat (individual accessibility).

A deterministic solution to the dinning philosophers is presented in [KPSZ02], in terms of binary processes. A binary process $Q(\vec{x} ; \vec{y})$ is an FDM with two observable variables $x$ and $y$. Two binary processes $Q$ and $R$ can be composed to yield another binary process, using the modular composition operator o defi ned by

$$
(Q \circ R)(x ; z)=[\text { restrict } y \text { in } Q(x ; y) \| R(y ; z)]
$$

where restrict $\mathbf{y}$ is an operator that removes variable $y$ from the set of observable variables and places it in the set of owned variables.

In Fig. 4 we present a chain of $n$ deterministic philosophers, each represented by a binary process $Q($ left; right $)$. This solution is studied in [KPSZ02] as an example of parametric systems, for which we seek a uniform verifi cation (i.e. a single verifi cation valid for any $n$ ). The uniform verifi cation is presented using the network invariant method, which calls for the identifi cation of a network invariant $\mathcal{I}$ which can safely replace the chain $Q^{n}$. The adequacy of the network invariant is verifi ed using an inductive argument which calls for the verifi cation of abstractions. In [KPSZ02] we present a deductive proof to the dinning philosophers, based on [AL94] abstraction mapping method, using two different network invariants.

In the current work, we consider the same invariants, and verify all the necessary abstractions using our algorithm for fair simulation. In both cases, no auxiliary (history and prophecy) variables are needed.

## The "Two-Halves" Abstraction

The fir rst network invariant $\mathcal{I}$ (left; right) is presented in Fig. 5 and can be viewed as the parallel composition of two "one-sided" philosophers. The compassion requirement reflects the fact that $\mathcal{I}$ can deadlock at location $\ell_{1}$ only if, from some point on, the fork on the right (right) remains continuously unavailable.

```
[\mp@code{IN(left; right)::}
\mathcal{J}:\negat_m
```

Figure 5: The Two-Halves Network Invariant

To establish that $\mathcal{I}$ is a network invariant, we verify the abstractions $(Q \circ Q) \sqsubseteq_{M} \mathcal{I}$ and $(Q \circ \mathcal{I}) \sqsubseteq_{M} \mathcal{I}$ using the fair simulation algorithm.

## The "Four-by-Three" Abstraction

An alternative network invariant is obtained by taking $\mathcal{I}=Q^{3}$, i.e. a chain of 3 philosophers. To prove that this is an invariant, it is suffi cient to establish the abstraction $Q^{4} \sqsubseteq_{M} Q^{3}$, that is, to prove that 3 philosophers can faithfully emulate 4 philosophers.

## Experimental Results

In our first implementation of the algorithm, we could not establish simulation between very simple obviously correct examples. Player $C$ could always win in a fi nite number of steps. The problem was with unfeasible states, namely states that do not participate in any computation. Player $C$ would enter an unfeasible state and player $A$ could not follow. To resolve this problem we remove all unfeasible states from both systems. Thus, the first step evaluates the set of feasible states for each of the players.

Since player $A$ can only move to correlated states, we reduce the number of variables by using a single set of observable variables for both systems. Finally, we optimize by reducing the options of player $A$ as follows. Recall that fair simulation implies simulation [HKR97]. Namely, simulation is a precondition for fair simulation. Let $S \subseteq \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ denote the maximal simulation relation. Instead of restricting player $A$ 's steps to $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ we restrict it further to $S$.

After all these optimizations, the following table summarizes the running time for some of the experiments we conducted.

| $(Q \circ Q) \sqsubseteq_{M} \mathcal{I}$ | 44 secs. |
| :--- | ---: |
| $(Q \circ \mathcal{I}) \sqsubseteq_{M} \mathcal{I}$ | 6 secs. |
| $Q^{4} \sqsubseteq_{M} Q^{3}$ | 178 secs. |

## 7 Acknowledgements

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## A Solving Generalized Streett[1] Games

Let $\mathcal{D}_{C}:\left\langle V_{C}, \mathcal{O}_{C}, \Theta_{C}, \rho_{C}, \mathcal{J}_{C}, \emptyset\right\rangle$ and $\mathcal{D}_{A}:\left\langle V_{A}, \mathcal{O}_{A}, \Theta_{A}, \rho_{A}, \mathcal{J}_{A}, \emptyset\right\rangle$ be two comparable JDS's where $\mathcal{J}_{C}=$ $\left\{J_{1}^{C}, \ldots, J_{m}^{C}\right\}$ and $\mathcal{J}_{A}=\left\{J_{1}^{A}, \ldots, J_{n}^{A}\right\}$. Let $G:\left\langle\mathcal{D}_{C}, \mathcal{D}_{A}\right\rangle$ be an sGs. We use the notation $i \oplus 1$ for $(i \bmod n)+1$. Let $M=[1 . . m], N=[1 . . n]$, and $\mathbb{N}$ denote the set of natural numbers.

The set $W_{A} \subset \Sigma_{G}$ of winning states for player $A$ is evaluated by the formula in equation (1).

$$
\left.\varphi=\nu\left[\begin{array}{c}
Z_{1}  \tag{1}\\
Z_{2} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
Z_{n}
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}
\mu Y\left(\bigvee _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \nu X \left(J_{1}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{2}\right.\right. & \vee & \otimes Y & \vee & \left.\neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{cccc} 
\\
\mu Y\left(\bigvee _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \nu X \left(J_{2}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{3}\right.\right. & \vee & \otimes Y & \vee \\
\left.\neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)
\end{array}\right)\right]
$$

We introduce some notations. Let $\sigma$ be some run of $G$. The game $g_{\sigma}$ is the restriction of $\sigma$ to even locations. When $\sigma$ is irrelevant or clear from the context we write $g$. Let $f_{C}$ and $f_{A}$ be strategies for players $C$ and $A$ respectively. Let $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ be the run compliant with both strategies and let $d_{0}^{C}, d_{2}^{C}, \ldots$ and $d_{0}^{A}, d_{2}^{A}, \ldots$ be the matching sequences of memory values. Let the outcome $o_{f_{C}, f_{A}}$ be the sequence $\left(d_{0}^{C}, d_{0}^{A}, s_{0}\right),\left(d_{2}^{C}, d_{2}^{A}, s_{2}\right), \ldots$ that consists of the memories of both strategies and the game $g_{\sigma}$. In case that one of the strategies is not important we remove its memory values from the sequence. We often abuse notations and confuse between $g_{\sigma}$ and $o_{f_{C}, f_{A}}$, we also write $g_{f_{C}, f_{A}}$ instead of $g_{\sigma}$

Claim $3 W_{A}=[[\varphi]]$
Proof: We claim that $W_{A}=Z_{1}$ at the end of the fi xpoint evaluation. ${ }^{4}$
We start by proving soundness of the claim, namely, showing that for every state $s \in Z_{1}, s$ is a winning state for player $A$. We adopt Walukiewicz' analysis of the $\mu$-calculus formula [Wal01]. From the evaluation of the fixpoint formula in (1), we derive a ranking for the states in $\Sigma_{c o r}$. We then use the ranking to defi ne a winning strategy for player $A$ from states in $Z_{1}$.

Based on the computation of the last iteration of the outermost fi xpoint, we defi ne a set of ranking functions $\mathcal{R}:\left\{r_{1}, \ldots, r_{n}\right\}$. For every $j \in N$, let $r_{j}: \Sigma_{\text {cor }} \rightarrow D \cup \infty$ where $D=\mathbb{N} \times M$ with the usual lexicographic ordering. For simplicity we denote the minimal value in $D$ by 1 instead of ( 1,1 ). Recall, that a run winning for player $A$ satisfi es

$$
\left(\bigwedge_{k \in M} \square \diamond J_{k}^{C}\right) \rightarrow\left(\bigwedge_{j \in N} \square \diamond J_{j}^{A}\right)
$$

That is, for a run to be winning, it is suffi cient that for some $k \in M, J_{k}^{C}$ be visited only finitely often or forall $j \in N, J_{j}^{A}$ has to be visited infi nitely often. Intuitively, when $r_{j}(s)=(l, k)$ we know that currently, player $A$ is trying to force the run to stay within $\neg J_{k}^{C}$ states. If she cannot do that, she can try and decrease $r_{j}$. When $r_{j}$ reaches 1 the state is a $J_{j}^{A}$ state. Thus, the strategy of player $A$ consists of decreasing $r_{j}$ and once reaching 1 moving to $r_{j \oplus 1}$.

[^4]Let $Z_{j}$ denote the fi xpoint value of variable $Z_{j}$. We denote by $Y_{j}^{i}$ the $i$ th iteration of $Y$ associated with $Z_{j}$. Formally, let $Y_{j}^{0}=\emptyset$ and $Y_{j}^{i}=\bigvee_{k=1}^{m} X_{j, k}^{i}$, where

$$
X_{j, k}^{i}=\nu X\left(J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \quad Y_{j}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)
$$

We defi ne the rankings as follows. For a state $s \in \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ such that $s \notin Z_{j}$ set $r_{j}(s)=\infty$. For a state $s \in \Sigma_{c o r}$ such that $s \in J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1}$ set $r_{j}(s)=1$. For a state $s \in \Sigma_{c o r}$ such that $s \in X_{j, k}^{i} \backslash \bigcup_{k^{\prime}<k} X_{j, k^{\prime}}^{i}$ and $s \notin Z_{j}^{i-1}$ set $r_{j}(s)=(i, k)$ (that is, $r_{j}$ is set to the least value $(i, k)$ for which $s \in X_{j, k}^{i}$ ).

Based on $\mathcal{R}$, we defi ne a strategy for player $A$. The memory used by the strategy is a value $j \in N$. Intuitively, when the memory of the strategy is $j$, player $A$ tries to decrease $r_{j}$. When $r_{j}$ reaches 1 , player $A$ updates her memory to $j \oplus 1$ and moves to a state for which $r_{j \oplus 1}$ is defi ned.

More formally, let $f: N \times \Sigma_{c o r} \times \Sigma_{G} \mapsto N \times \Sigma_{\text {cor }}$ be the strategy for player $A$. If $r_{j}(s)=\infty$ or for a state $t$ which is not an $C$-successor of $s$ then $f(j, s, t)$ is undefi ned. Otherwise, if $r_{j}(s)=1$ then $f(j, s, t)=\left(j \oplus 1, s^{\prime}\right)$ such that $s^{\prime}$ is some $A$-successor of $t$ and $r_{j \oplus 1}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq \infty$. In Claim 6 we show that this is indeed possible. If $r_{j}(s)>1$ then $f(j, s, t)=\left(j, s^{\prime}\right)$ such that $s^{\prime}$ is an $A$-successor of $t$ and for every $A$-successor $u$ of $t$ we have $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \leq r_{j}(u)$. In Claim 6 we show that such a successor state exists and that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \leq r_{j}(s)$.

Claim 6 Let $s$ be a state in $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. If $r_{j}(s) \neq \infty$ and $f(j, s, t)=\left(j^{\prime}, s^{\prime}\right)$ then $r_{j^{\prime}}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq \infty$.
Proof: For $j \in N, Z_{j}$ is a fi xpoint. Hence, there exists some value $p \geq 1$ such that $Z_{j}=Y_{j}^{p}=Y_{j}^{p+1}$. It follows that $Z_{j}=\bigvee_{k=1}^{m} X_{j, k}^{p}$ where $X_{j, k}^{p}=J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \quad Z_{j} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge X_{j, k}^{p}$. For every state $s \in Z_{j}$, either $s \in J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1}$ or $s \in \otimes Z_{j}$. In the first case, $r_{j}(s)=1$ and player $A$ can control the game to reach a successor state $s^{\prime}$ such that $s^{\prime} \in Z_{j \oplus 1}$ implying $r_{j \oplus 1}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq \infty$. In the second case, player $A$ can control the game to reach a successor state $s^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq \infty$.

Claim 7 Let s be a state in $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. If $r_{j}(s) \neq \infty$ and $f(j, s, t)=\left(j^{\prime}, s^{\prime}\right)$ then one of the following holds:

1. $r_{j}(s)=1$.
2. $j=j^{\prime}$ and $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)<r_{j}(s)$.
3. $j=j^{\prime}$ and $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)=r_{j}(s)$, provided $r_{j}(s)=(l, k)$ and $s \vDash \neg J_{k}^{C}$.

Proof: Recall that $Y_{j}^{i}=\bigvee_{k=1}^{m} X_{j, k}^{i}$ where $X_{j, k}^{i}=\nu X\left(J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \quad Y_{j}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X\right)$. Suppose $s \in Y_{j}^{i} \backslash Y_{j}^{i-1}$. Then $s \in J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \otimes Y_{j}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \bigvee_{k=1}^{m} \neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X_{j, k}^{i}$. If $s \in$ $J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1}$ then $r_{j}(s)=1$ and we are done. If $s \in \otimes Y_{j}^{i-1}$ then player $A$ can control the game to get to a successor state $s^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)<r_{j}(s)$. Suppose $s \in X_{j, k}^{i} \backslash\left(J_{j}^{A} \wedge \otimes Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \otimes Y_{j}^{i-1}\right)$ and $s \notin\left(\bigcup_{k^{\prime}<k} X_{j, k^{\prime}}^{i}\right)$. Then we know $r_{j}(s)=(i, k)$ and $s \in \neg J_{k}^{C} \wedge \otimes X_{j, k}^{i}$. In particular player $A$ can control the game to get to a successor state $s^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \leq r_{j}(s)$ and $s \models \neg J_{k}^{C}$ (the case of $<$ follows in the case that $s^{\prime} \in X_{j, k^{\prime}}^{i}$ for some $k^{\prime}<k$ ).

Let $s$ be a state in $Z_{1}$.
Claim 8 Every s-run compliant with $f$ is winning for player $A$.

Proof: Let $g_{f}:\left\langle n_{0}, s_{0}\right\rangle,\left\langle n_{1}, s_{1}\right\rangle, \ldots$ denote the outcome of $f$ from state $s$ (that is, all the states in $g_{f}$ are the correlated states in the $s$-run compliant with $f$ ). From Claim 6 we know that for every $i \geq 0$ we have $r_{n_{i}}\left(s_{i}\right) \neq \infty$. From Claim 7 it follows that either there are infi nitely many $i \geq 0$ such that $r_{n_{i}}\left(s_{i}\right)=1$ or there exists a value $i \geq 0$ and $j \in N$ such that forall $i^{\prime}>i$ we have $n_{i^{\prime}}=j$. In the first case, whenever $g_{f}$ visits a location $\left(n_{i}, s_{i}\right)$ such that $r_{n_{i}}\left(s_{i}\right)=1$ then $s_{i} \models J_{n_{i}}^{A}$ and $n_{i+1}=n_{i} \oplus 1$. Hence, $g_{f} \Downarrow_{V_{A}}$ is a computation of $\mathcal{D}_{A}$ and player $A$ wins. In the second case, we know from Claim 7 that forall $l>i$ we have $r_{j}\left(s_{l}\right) \leq r_{j}\left(s_{l+1}\right)$. Then, there exists some $p>i$ such that forall $p^{\prime}>p$ we have $r_{j}\left(s_{p^{\prime}}\right)=(a, k)$ for some $a \geq 0$ and $k \in M$. However, in this case forall $p^{\prime}>p$ we have $s_{p^{\prime}} \models \neg J_{k}^{C}$ and $g_{f} \Downarrow_{V_{C}}$ is not a computation of $\mathcal{D}_{C}$. Again player $A$ wins.

Next we prove completeness of claim 3, namely, showing that for every state $s \notin Z_{1}, s$ is a winning state for player $C$. It is quite simple to see that the following fi xpoint is the complement of Equation 1 .

$$
\left.\neg \varphi=\mu\left[\begin{array}{c}
Z_{1}  \tag{2}\\
Z_{2} \\
\vdots \\
\vdots \\
Z_{n}
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}
\nu Y\left(\bigwedge_{k=1}^{m} \mu X(\mathbb{D}) Z_{2}\right. & \vee & \neg J_{1}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{D} Y & \vee & \left.\neg J_{1}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{D} X\right)
\end{array}\right]\left[\begin{array}{cccc}
k M\left(\bigwedge _ { k = 1 } ^ { m } \mu X \left(\mathbb{D} Z_{3}\right.\right. & \vee & \neg J_{2}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{D} Y & \vee \\
\left.\neg J_{2}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{D} X\right)
\end{array}\right)\right]
$$

Note that we replace $\otimes$ with ( $\mathbb{D}$. Recall that both $\otimes$ and $(\mathbb{D})$ allow player $C$ to make the first choice. However $\otimes$ demands that for every choice of player $C$ there exist a choice of player $A$ and $\mathbb{D}$ demands that there exists a choice of player $C$ that is good enough forall choices of player $A$. As before, from the evaluation of the fi xpoint formula in 2 we derive a ranking for the states in $\Sigma_{c o r}$. We then use the ranking to defi ne a winning strategy for player $C$.

For each of the $Z_{j}$ 's, let $Y_{j}$ denote the value of $Y_{j}$ at the last iteration of $\nu Y$. The value of $Y_{j}$ is defi ned by a conjunction over $m$ conjuncts. First we show that for every $k, k^{\prime} \in[1 . . m]$ the $k$ and $k^{\prime}$ conjuncts are equal regardless of the value of $Z_{j \oplus 1}$. Equation 3 is the fi xpoint computing $Y_{j}$.

$$
\nu Y\left[\begin{array}{c}
\bigwedge_{k=1}^{m} \mu X\left(\mathbb{D} Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{O} Y \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{O} X\right) \tag{3}
\end{array}\right]
$$

For some value of $Z_{j \oplus 1}$ let $Y_{j}$ denote the outcome of Equation 3. We denote by $x_{j, k}^{i}$ the $i$ th iteration of the $k$ th conjunct in $\nu Y_{j}$. Formally, let $X_{j, k}^{0}=\emptyset$, and $X_{j, k}^{i}=(\mathbb{D}) Z \quad \vee \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge(1) Y_{j} \quad \vee \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge(1) X_{j, k}^{i-1}$.

We say that a state $s$ is $i$-far ${ }_{j, k}$ if there exists a strategy $f_{C}$ such that every $s$-run $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ compliant with $f$ satisfi es all the following.

- There exists some $l \leq i$ such that $s_{2 l} \in J_{k}^{C} \wedge\left(\mathbb{C} Y_{j} \quad \vee \mathbb{( D )} Z_{j \oplus 1}\right.$.
- Forall $l^{\prime}<l$ we have $s_{2 l^{\prime}} \not \vDash J_{j}^{A}$.
- Either $s_{2 l} \not \vDash J_{j}^{A}$ or $s_{2 l} \in \mathbb{( 1 )} Z_{j \oplus 1}$.

Claim $9 s \in X_{j, k}^{i}$ iff $s$ is $i$-far $r_{j, k}$.

Proof: Suppose $s \in X_{j, k}^{i} \backslash X_{j, k}^{i-1}$. If $i=1$ then it must be the case that $s \in \mathbb{C} Z_{j \oplus 1} \quad \vee \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge\left(\mathbb{C} Y_{j}\right.$. Clearly, the claim follows. If $i>1$ then it must be the case that $s \in \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge \subseteq X_{j, k}^{i-1}$, by induction the claim follows.

Suppose that $s$ is $i-\operatorname{far}_{j, k}$. We show by induction on $i$ that $s \in X_{j, k}^{i}$. If $i=1$ then clearly $s \in X_{j, k}^{1}$. Suppose $i>1$ then player $C$ can force the game to state $t$ such that $t$ is $(i-1)$-far ${ }_{j, k}$. By induction $t \in X_{j, k}^{i-1}$ and $s \in X_{j, k}^{i}$.

$$
\text { Denote } X_{j, k}=\bigcup_{i \geq 0} X_{j, k}^{i}
$$

Corollary 10 Forall $k, k^{\prime} \in M$ we have $X_{j, k}=X_{j, k^{\prime}}$.
Proof: Suppose $s \in X_{k}$. Then $s$ is $i$-far ${ }_{j, k}$ for some $i$. Consider the strategy $f_{C}$ and the run $\sigma: s_{0}, s_{1}, \ldots$ compliant with $f_{C}$. Suppose $\left.s_{2 l} \in J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{(}\right) Y_{j} \quad \vee \mathbb{( 1 )} Z_{j \oplus 1}$ for some $l \leq i$. If $s_{2 l} \in J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{( D} Y_{j}$. Then player $C$ can force the game into some state $s^{\prime} \in X_{j, k^{\prime}}$. It follows that $s^{\prime}$ is $i^{\prime}$-far ${ }_{j, k^{\prime}}$ with some strategy $f_{C}^{\prime}$. By combining the strategies $f_{C}$ and $f_{C}^{\prime}$ we show that $s \in X_{j, k^{\prime}}$.

Based on the computation of the fi xpoint, we defi ne a set of ranking functions $\mathcal{R}:\left\{r, \ldots, r_{n}\right\}$. For every $j \in N$, let $r_{j}: \Sigma_{\text {cor }} \rightarrow D \cup\{\infty\}$ where $D=\mathbb{N}^{m+1}$. For $d \in D$ we denote by $d[0]$ the fir rst entry in $d$ and for $k \in M, d[k]$ is the $k+1$ entry in $d$. Recall, that a run winning for player $C$ satisfi es

$$
\left(\bigwedge_{k \in M} \square \diamond J_{k}^{C}\right) \wedge \neg\left(\bigwedge_{j \in N} \square \diamond J_{j}^{A}\right)
$$

That is, for every $k \in M, J_{k}^{C}$ is visited infi nitely often and for some $j \in N$, $J_{j}^{A}$ is visited only finitely often. Intuitively, when $r_{j}(s)=\left(l, l_{1}, \ldots, l_{m}\right)$ it means that currently, player $C$ tries to avoid visiting $J_{j}^{A}$. She may still change her mind $l$ times as to which $J \in \mathcal{J}^{A}$ she avoids. The number $l_{k}$ denotes the distance to a $J_{k}^{C}$ state in case that player $C$ does not change her mind. Thus, player $C$ reduces first $l_{1}$ until a visit to $J_{1}^{C}$ then reduces $l_{2}$ and so on. The strategy of player $C$ consists of deciding which $J \in \mathcal{J}^{A}$ is visited fin nitely often and then for each $k \in M$ forcing a visit to $J_{k}^{C}$.

Let $Z_{j}^{i}$ denote the $i$ th iteration of $\mu Z_{j}$. Let $X_{j, k}^{i, l}$ denote the $l$ th iteration of the $k$ th conjunct in the computation of $Z_{j}^{i}$. Formally, we have the following. Let $Z_{j}^{0}=\emptyset$,

$$
\left.Z_{j}^{i}=\nu Y\left[\begin{array}{llll}
\bigwedge_{k=1}^{m} \mu X\left(\mathbb{C} Z_{j \oplus 1}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \oplus(\mid) Y\right. & \vee & \left.\neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{(}\right) X
\end{array}\right)\right]
$$

For every state $s \in Z_{j}^{i} \backslash Z_{j}^{i-1}$ we set $r_{j}(s)[0]=i$. That is the first location in $r_{j}(s)$ stores the iteration of $\mu Z$ where $s$ is first included in $Z_{j}^{i}$. Notice that from Corollary 10 it follows that for every $k$,

$$
\begin{equation*}
Z_{j}^{i}=\mathbb{( C )} Z_{j \oplus 1}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{D} Z_{j}^{i} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{D} \mid Z_{j}^{i} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

As above, let

$$
\left.X_{j, k}^{i, 0}=\emptyset \text { and } X_{j, k}^{i, l}=\mathbb{(}\right) Z_{j \oplus 1}^{i-1} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{( 1 )} Z_{j}^{i} \quad \vee \quad \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge \mathbb{( D )} X_{i, l-1}^{j, k}
$$

Notice that for every $k \in M$ we have $Z_{j}^{i}=\bigcup_{l \geq 0} X_{j, k}^{i, l}$. For every state $s \in X_{j, k}^{i, l} \backslash\left(X_{j, k}^{i, l-1} \cup Z_{j}^{i-1}\right)$ we set $r_{j}(s)[k]=l$. That is, the $k$ th entry in $r_{j}(s)$ stores the iteration of the $k$ th conjunct in which $s$ is first included
in $X_{j, k}^{i, l}$. From Corollary 10 it follows that for every state $s$ in $Z_{j}^{i}$ we have either $r_{j}(s)[0]<i$ or $r_{j}(s)[0]=i$ and for every $k \in M, r_{j}(s)[k]$ is set in the $i$ th stage.

Based on $\mathcal{R}$, we defi ne a strategy for player $C$. The memory used by the strategy is a value $(j, k) \in$ $N \times M$. That is, work with $r_{j}$ and with entry $k$ in $r_{j}$. Intuitively, when the memory of the strategy is $(j, k)$, player $C$ tries to move to states for which $r_{j \oplus 1}[0]$ is lower and updates her memory to $(j \oplus 1,1)$. If player $C$ cannot do that, she tries to decrease $r_{j}[0]$ or $r_{j}[k]$. When $r_{j}[k]$ reaches 1 , we are ensured that we are in a $J_{k}^{C}$ state and player $C$ updates her memory to $(j,(k \bmod m)+1)$. More formally we have the following.

Let $f: N \times M \times \Sigma_{c o r} \rightarrow N \times M \times \Sigma_{G}$ be the strategy for player $C$. Let $s$ be some state such that $r_{j}(s)=\infty$, then for every $k \in M, f(j, k, s)$ is undefi ned. Let $s$ be some state such that $r_{j}(s) \neq \infty$. The strategy $f$ chooses the first possible option from the following.

1. If there exists a $C$-successor $t$ of $s$ such that forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $r_{j \oplus 1}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]<r_{j}(s)[0]$ then $f(j, k, s)=(j \oplus 1,1, t)$.
2. If there exists a $C$-successor $t$ of $s$ such that forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]<r_{j}(s)[0]$ then $f(j, k, s)=(j, 1, t)$.
3. If $r_{j}(s)[k]=1$ and there exists a $C$-successor $t$ of $s$ such that forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]=r_{j}(s)[0]$ then $f(j, k, s)=(j,(k \bmod m)+1, t)$.
4. If $r_{j}(s)[k] \neq 0$ and there exists a $C$-successors $t$ of $s$ such that forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]=r_{j}(s)[0]$ and $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[k]<r_{j}(s)[k]$ then $f(j, k, s)=(j, k, t)$.

We show that this strategy is feasible and that it is a winning strategy for player $C$.
Claim 11 Let $s$ be a state in $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. If $r_{j}(s) \neq \infty$ and $f(j, k, s)=\left(j^{\prime}, k^{\prime}, t\right)$ then forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $s$, $r_{j^{\prime}}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq \infty$.

Proof: Let $r_{j}(s)[0]=i$. From Equation 4 it follows that there exists a $C$-successor $t$ of $s$ such that either forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $s^{\prime} \in Z_{j \oplus 1}^{i-1}$ or forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ we have $s^{\prime} \in Z_{j}^{i}$.

Claim 12 Let $s$ be a state in $\Sigma_{\text {cor }}$. If $r_{j}(s) \neq \infty$ and $f(j, k, s)=\left(j^{\prime}, k^{\prime}, t\right)$ then one of the following holds forall $A$-successors $s^{\prime}$ of $t$ :

- $r_{j^{\prime}}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]<r_{j}(s)[0]$
- $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]=r_{j}(s)[0]$ and either $s \models J_{k}^{C}$ or $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[k]<r_{j}(s)[k]$.

Proof: From Claim 11 we know that player $C$ can control the game so that forall $s^{\prime}$ we have $r_{j}^{\prime}\left(s^{\prime}\right) \neq$ $\infty$. From Equation 4 we know that player $C$ can control the game so that $r_{j}^{\prime}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0] \leq r_{j}(s)[0]$. Suppose $r_{j}(s)[0]=l$ and $r_{j}(s)[k]=1$. Then $s \in X_{l, 1}^{j, k}$. Hence, either $s \in \mathbb{D} Z_{j \oplus 1}^{i-1}$ or $s \in \neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C} \wedge \mathbb{D} Z_{j}^{i}$. In the first case player $C$ can control the game so that it reaches a location $S^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j \oplus 1}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0]<r_{j}(s)[0]$. In the second case $s \mid=\neg J_{j}^{A} \wedge J_{k}^{C}$ and player $C$ can control the game to reach a state $s^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[0] \leq$ $r_{j}(s)[0]$. Suppose $r_{j}(s)[k]=a>1$ then $s \in X_{l, a}^{j, k} \backslash X_{l, a-1}^{j, k}$. Clearly, $s \mid=\neg J_{j}^{A}$ and player $C$ can control the game so that it reaches a state $s^{\prime}$ such that $r_{j}\left(s^{\prime}\right)[k]<r_{j}(s)[k]$.

Let $s$ be a state in $Z_{1}$.
Claim 13 Every s-run compliant with $f$ is winning for player $C$.

Proof: Let $g_{f}:\left\langle\left(n_{0}, m_{0}\right), s_{0}\right\rangle,\left\langle\left(n_{1}, m_{1}\right), s_{1}\right\rangle, \ldots$ denote the outcome of $f$ from state $s$ (that is, all the states in $g_{f}$ are the correlated states in the $s$-run compliant with $f$ ). From Claim 11 we know that for every $i \geq 0$ we have $r_{n_{i}}\left(s_{i}\right) \neq \infty$. From Claim 12 we know that there exists some $i$ such that forall $i^{\prime} \geq i$ we have $n_{i^{\prime}}=j$ for some $j \in N$ and $r_{j}\left(s_{i^{\prime}}\right)[0]=l$ for some $l \in \mathbb{N}$. Clearly, it cannot be the case that $s_{i^{\prime}} \models J_{j}^{A}$ for $i^{\prime} \geq i$. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a point $a>i$ such that forall $a^{\prime} \geq a$ we have $s_{a^{\prime}} \not \equiv J_{k}^{C}$. We know that $r_{j}\left(s_{a^{\prime}}\right)\left[m_{a^{\prime}}\right]$ is defi ned. According to Claim $12 r_{j}\left(s_{a^{\prime}}\right)\left[m_{a^{\prime}}\right]$ decreases. There exists a point $a^{\prime}>a$ such that $r_{j}\left(s_{a^{\prime}}\right)\left[m_{a^{\prime}}\right]=1$, and $m_{a^{\prime}+1}=\left(m_{a^{\prime}} \bmod m\right)+1$. Similarly, according to Claim 12 $r_{j}\left(s_{a^{\prime}}\right)\left[\left(m_{a^{\prime}} \bmod m\right)+1\right]$ decreases. So the game reaches some point where $J_{k}^{C}$ holds in contradiction to the assumption. We conclude that $g_{f} \Downarrow_{V_{A}}$ is not a computation ( $J_{j}^{A}$ is visited finitely often) and that $g_{f} \Downarrow_{V_{C}}$ is a computation. Hence, player $C$ wins.


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ There are more effi cient algorithms for $\mu$-calculus model checking [Jur00]. However, Jurdzinski's algorithm cannot be implemented symbolically and we do not use it.

[^2]:    ${ }^{2}$ One may ask why not take one step further and convert the original reactive systems to B"uchi systems (with one fairness set each). In this case, the induced game is a parity[3] game and there is a simple algorithm for solving it. We also tried to implement this approach. Although both algorithms work in cubic time, the latter performed much worse than the one described above.

[^3]:    ${ }^{3}$ Only for fi nite game structures.

[^4]:    ${ }^{4}$ Actually, all $Z_{i}$ 's return the same set. This follows from the proof below. However, we do not use this fact in the proof.

