

On infinitary connectives in modal logics

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January 27, 2011

Why infinitary connectives?

- Strengthen the expressive power of logics:
 - Infinite objects (e.g. canonical formulas for infinite structure).
 - Concepts which cannot be expressed by first order theory (e.g. finiteness).
 - Concepts which is defined by nesting (e.g. common knowledge property).
- As a tool to show various properties of standard proof systems.

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Cut free system

We present cut free systems for:

- infinitary modal logic characterised by Kripke frames;
 - common knowledge logic characterised by Kripke frames.
- ♠ Common knowledge logic does not have infinitary conjunction nor disjunction, but allows a non-compact inference rule for common knowledge operator.

Syntax

Syntax for infinitary modal logic:

- Language:
 - $p, \wedge, \vee, \supset, \neg, \Box$
- Formulas
 - For any countable set Θ of formulas, $\wedge \Theta$ and $\vee \Theta$ are well defined formulas.


System TLM for infinitary modal logic

We introduce a system TLM for infinitary modal logic, based on sequent calculus.

- A sequent of TLM is a finite tree of usual sequents.
- Any inference rule of TLM, except for those for modality, is an application of usual rule to one of a node of the tree.


System TLM for infinitary modal logic

- ♠ The left introduction rule of \bigwedge of TLM: Here, Σ is a countable subset of Θ .



System TLM for infinitary modal logic


- ♠ The set of upper sequents of the right introduction rule of \wedge of TLM is countable.



System TLM for infinitary modal logic

♠ Left introduction of BOX:


$\Box\phi$ can be introduced to the left hand side of a node if ϕ is in the left hand side of any successor of the node.



System TLM for infinitary modal logic

♠ Right introduction of BOX:

$\Box\phi$ can be introduced to the right hand side of a node if it has a leaf of the form $\rightarrow\phi$. The leaf will be cut off.



System TLM for infinitary modal logic

- ♠ A formula ϕ is *derivable* in TLM if a tree $\rightarrow \phi$, which consists only one node, is derivable.

Theorem

TLM is sound and complete with respect to the class of all Kripke frames.

Theorem

If ϕ is derivable in TLM, then it is derivable without using cut rule.

Concept of common knowledge

- ♠ By using tree sequent system, we can obtain a cut free system for common knowledge logic, which has neither infinitary conjunction nor disjunction, but does not satisfy compactness.

Concept of common knowledge:

Let I be a fixed class of agents and A be an idea. Suppose A belongs to the common knowledge of the class I of agents and i and j are some members of I . Then

- 1 i and j know A .
- 2 i knows that j knows A and j knows that i knows A , as well.
- 3 i also knows that j knows that i knows A , and vice versa...

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Common knowledge logic

Express the concept of common knowledge in modal logic:

- $\Box_i \phi$: i knows ϕ (for each $i \in I$)
- $\Box_c \phi$: ϕ belongs to the common knowledge
- $\models \Box_c \phi \leftrightarrow \forall n \in \omega \forall i_1, \dots, i_n \in I (\models \Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi)$.

It is known that the class of Kripke frames which satisfy the above condition is not axiomatizable by any modal logic with compactness.

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Cut free system for common knowledge logic

Define a tree sequent system TCK by the same way as TLM in such way that

- allow only finite conjunction and disjunction;
- left introduction of \Box_c to a node:

$$\forall n \forall i_1, \dots, i_n (\vdash \Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi, \Gamma \rightarrow \Delta) \Rightarrow \vdash \Box_c \phi, \Gamma \rightarrow \Delta;$$

- right introduction of \Box_c to a node:

$$\exists n \exists i_1, \dots, i_n (\vdash \Gamma \rightarrow \Delta, \Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi) \Rightarrow \vdash \Gamma \rightarrow \Delta, \Box_c \phi.$$

♠ The inference rules for \Box_c in TCK is an application of the rules for \wedge in TLM to a formula $\bigwedge \{ \Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi \mid n \in \omega, i_1, \dots, i_n \in I \}$.

Cut free system for common knowledge logic

Theorem

TLM is sound and complete with respect to the class of Kripke frames.

♠ We can define a cut free system for predicate common knowledge logic in the same way.

Representation and Kripke completeness

- ♠ Jónsson-Tarski representation provide Kripke completeness of modal logics in a modular way.
- ♠ We show a representation theorem of modal algebras which preserves countably many infinitary meets and joins.
- ♠ From the extended representation theorem, Kripke completeness of infinitary, predicate and non-compact logics follows in a modular way.

Modal algebra

- An algebra $\langle A, \wedge, \vee, -, \Box, 0, 1 \rangle$ is called a *Modal algebra* if $\langle A, \wedge, \vee, -, 0, 1 \rangle$ is a Boolean algebra and \Box is a unary operator such that

$$\Box 1 = 1$$

$$\Box(x \wedge y) = \Box x \wedge \Box y$$

for any x and y in A .

- We write $\mathcal{F}_p(A)$ for the set of all prime filters of A and A_+ for the frame $\langle \mathcal{F}_p(A), <_R \rangle$, where

$$F <_R G \Leftrightarrow \Box^{-1}[F] \subseteq G.$$

Modal algebra

Let $\mathcal{F} = \langle W, R \rangle$ be a Kripke frame. We write \mathcal{F}^+ for the modal algebra

$$\langle \wp(W), \cap, \cup, W \setminus, \Box, \emptyset, W \rangle,$$

where $\Box X$ is defined by

$$\Box X = W \setminus \downarrow_R (W \setminus X)$$

for any $X \subseteq W$.

Jónsson-Tarski representation

Let $\eta : A \rightarrow (A_+)^+$ be

$$\eta(x) = \{F \in \mathcal{F}_\rho(A) \mid x \in F\},$$

for any $x \in A$. Then, η is an embedding of modal algebras.

Here,

$$(A_+)^+ = \langle \wp(\mathcal{F}_\rho(A)), \cap, \cup, \mathcal{F}_\rho(A) \setminus, \square, \emptyset, \mathcal{F}_\rho(A) \rangle$$

where

$$\square X = \mathcal{F}_\rho(A) \setminus \downarrow_R (\mathcal{F}_\rho(A) \setminus X)$$

for any $X \in \wp(\mathcal{F}_\rho(A))$.

Q-filter

Let A be a modal algebra and Q a countable subset of $\wp(A)$.

A prime filter F of A is called a *Q-filter*, if it satisfies the following properties:

- ① for any $X \in Q$, if $X \subseteq F$ and $\bigwedge X \in A$ then $\bigwedge X \in F$;
- ② for any $X \in Q$, if $\bigvee X \in F$ then there exists $x \in X$ such that $x \in F$.

A homomorphism $f : A \rightarrow B$ of modal algebras is said to be *Q-complete*, if for any $X \in Q$

$$f(\bigwedge X) = \bigwedge f[X], \quad f(\bigvee X) = \bigvee f[X]$$

whenever, $\bigwedge X \in A$ or $\bigvee X \in A$, respectively.

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Q-filter

We write $\mathcal{F}_Q(A)$ for the set of Q -filters of A , $A_{\#}$ for the frame $\langle \mathcal{F}_Q(A), <_R \rangle$.

♠ We show that for certain Q , there exists a Q -complete embedding of modal algebras from A to $(A_{\#})^+$. Here, $(A_{\#})^+$ is

$$(A_{\#})^+ = \langle \wp(\mathcal{F}_Q(A)), \cap, \cup, \mathcal{F}_Q(A) \setminus, \square, \emptyset, \mathcal{F}_Q(A) \rangle.$$

Extension of Jónsson-Tarski representation

Theorem

Let A be a modal algebra and Q a countable subset of $\wp(A)$ which satisfies the following, for any $X \in Q$:

- ① if $\bigwedge X \in A$ then $\bigwedge \Box X = \Box \bigwedge X$;
- ② if $\bigwedge X \in A$ then $Y = \{\Box(z \rightarrow x) \mid x \in X\} \in Q$ and $\bigwedge Y \in A$ for any $z \in A$;
- ③ if $\bigvee X \in A$ then $Y = \{\Box(x \rightarrow z) \mid x \in X\} \in Q$ and $\bigwedge Y \in A$ for any $z \in A$.

Then, $\eta : x \mapsto \{F \in \mathcal{F}_Q(A) \mid x \in F\}$ is a Q -complete embedding of modal algebras from A to $(A_{\#})^+$.

Variant of Barcan formula

- From extended Jónsson-Tarski representation, we obtain Kripke completeness of some infinitary logics.

We write BF_{ω_1} for the formula

$$\bigwedge_{i \in \omega} \Box p_i \supset \Box \bigwedge_{i \in \omega} p_i.$$

Note that BF_{ω_1} is a translation of a formula

$$\text{BF} = \forall x \Box \phi \supset \Box \forall x \phi$$

of predicate modal logic, which is known as Barcan formula, into infinitary logic.

Universal logic

- A class C of Kripke frames is said to be *universal*, if there exists a set Φ of first order closed formulas of the shape $\forall x_1 \cdots \forall x_n \psi$, where ψ is constructed from variables, predicates R and $=$ and connectives \wedge , \vee , \neg and \supset , such that

$$C = \{ \mathcal{F} \mid \mathcal{F} \text{ satisfies } \Phi \text{ as a first order structure} \}.$$

- A normal modal logic \mathbf{L} is said to be *universal*, if the class

$$C = \{ \mathcal{F} \mid \mathcal{F} \models \mathbf{L} \}$$

of Kripke frames is universal.

Kripke completeness

Let \mathbf{L} be a normal modal logic. We write \mathbf{L}_{ω_1} for the infinitary logic defined by \mathbf{L} and BF_{ω_1} .

Theorem

Let \mathbf{L} be a normal modal logic. If \mathbf{L} is universal, \mathbf{L}_{ω_1} is complete with respect to the class $C = \{\mathcal{F} \mid \mathcal{F} \models \mathbf{L}\}$ of Kripke frames.

Application to predicate modal logics

- ◆ Same argument can be applied to predicate modal logics.

Let \mathbf{K}_* be the least predicate extension of \mathbf{K} .

It is known that $\mathbf{BF} = \forall x \Box \phi \supset \Box \forall x \phi$ axiomatizes the class of Kripke frames with constant domain.

Then, completeness theorem follows from extended representation theorem, immediately:

Theorem

Let \mathbf{L} be a normal modal logic. If \mathbf{L} is universal, $\mathbf{K}_ \oplus \mathbf{L} \oplus \mathbf{BF}$ is complete with respect to the class $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{F} \mid \mathcal{F} \models \mathbf{L}\}$ of Kripke frames with constant domain.*

Language of non-compact modal logic

♠ We apply extended representation theorem to non-compact modal logics.

We consider propositional modal logics such that:

- with a countable set $\{\Box_i \mid i \in \omega\}$ of modal operators;
- without infinitary connectives;
- with non-compact axiom.

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Non-compact theory of modal logic

Non-compact theory:

- A theory T is said to be *satisfiable*, if there exists a Kripke model \mathcal{M} and a world w in \mathcal{M} such that any formula in T is valid at w .
- A theory T is said to be *compact*, if T is satisfiable if and only if every finite subset of T is satisfiable.

Non-compact theory of modal logic

Example

Let $\Box_c \phi$ be the formula which expresses that ϕ is a common knowledge among the agent I and \Box_i the formula which says that $i \in I$ knows ϕ . Now, the common knowledge condition is expressed in a Kripke frame in the following way:

$$w \models \Box_c \phi \Leftrightarrow \forall n \in \omega \forall i_1, \dots, i_n \in I (w \models \Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi)$$

Then, the theory

$$\{\Box_{i_1} \dots \Box_{i_n} \phi \mid n \in \omega, i_1, \dots, i_n \in I\} \cup \{\neg \Box_c \phi\}$$

is not compact.

Non-compact modal logic

Let Γ be a countable set of formulas. We say that an axiom $\Gamma \rightarrow \phi$ is compact, if the theory $T = \Gamma \cup \{\neg\phi\}$ is compact.

Let α be a set $\{\Gamma_i \rightarrow \phi_i \mid i \in \omega\}$ of axiom schemata. The symbol $\mathbf{K}(\alpha)$ denotes the logic defined by \mathbf{K} and the set α of axiom schemata.

We say that $\mathbf{K}(\alpha)$ is non-compact if some of the axioms in α is non-compact.

♠ We assume the following condition:

(\sharp) The set α is consistent and all instances of $\Gamma_i \rightarrow \phi_i$ in α is countable for each $i \in \omega$.

Non-compact modal logic

Example

Axiom schemata CK for common knowledge logic is:

- 1 $\{\Box_{i_1} \cdots \Box_{i_n} p \mid n \in \omega, i_1, \dots, i_n \in I\} \rightarrow \Box_c p;$
- 2 $\Box_c p \rightarrow \Box_{i_1} \cdots \Box_{i_n} p \ (n \in \omega, i_1, \dots, i_n \in I).$

CK satisfies ($\#$).

Non-compact modal logic

Example

Axiom schemata DL for dynamic logic is:

- 1 $[a + b]p \rightarrow [a]p, [a + b]p \rightarrow [b]p;$
- 2 $[a]p, [b]p \rightarrow [a + b]p;$
- 3 $[a; b]p \rightarrow [a][b]p;$
- 4 $[a][b]p \rightarrow [a; b]p;$
- 5 $[a^*]p \rightarrow [a]^n p$ for any $n \in \omega;$
- 6 $\{[a]^n p \mid n \in \omega\} \rightarrow [a^*]p.$

DL satisfies (#).

Model-existence theorem for non-compact logic

Theorem

Let α be a set of axiom schemata which satisfies $(\#)$. Then, there exists a Kripke model \mathcal{M} such that α is valid in \mathcal{M} , and $\phi \in \mathbf{K}(\alpha)$ if and only if $\mathcal{M} \models \phi$ for any formula ϕ .

Proof.

For each axiom $\Gamma \rightarrow \phi$ in α , we have

$$\bigvee \neg \Gamma \cup \{\phi\} = 1$$

in Lindenbaum algebra. Apply extended representation theorem so as to preserve these infinite joins. □

♠ We can also discuss predicate non-compact modal logics in the same way.

Jankov's theorem for canonical formula

- ♠ We extend Jankov's theorem of canonical formula for finite Heyting algebras to infinite Heyting algebras.

Theorem

(Jankov 69). For any subdirectly irreducible finite Heyting algebra A , there exists a canonical formula χ_A with such a property that for any Heyting algebra B , $B \not\models \chi_A$ if and only if there exists a Heyting algebra D , a monomorphism $e : A \rightarrow D$ and an epimorphism $f : B \rightarrow D$.

Jankov formula

Let A be a subdirectly irreducible complete Heyting algebra and β the second greatest element of A . Then, *the extended Jankov's formula* χ_A for A is defined by

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_A = & \left(\bigwedge_{X \subseteq A} (p_{\bigwedge X} \equiv \bigwedge_{x \in X} p_x) \wedge \bigwedge_{X \subseteq A} (p_{\bigvee X} \equiv \bigvee_{x \in X} p_x) \right) \\ & \wedge \bigwedge_{x, y \in A} (p_{x \rightarrow y} \equiv p_x \supset p_y) \wedge \bigwedge_{x \in A} (p_{x \rightarrow 0_A} \equiv \neg p_x) \\ & \supset p_\beta, \end{aligned}$$

where $\{p_x \mid x \in A\}$ is a set of pairwise distinct propositional variables corresponding to the elements of A .

- It is straightforward to show that for any CHA B , if there exists a CHA D , a continuous monomorphism $e : A \rightarrow D$ and a continuous epimorphism $f : B \rightarrow D$, then $B \not\equiv \chi_A$.
- However, we cannot prove the converse by the method developed by Jankov. To show it by Jankov's method, we have to show that if $v(\chi_A) \neq 1_B$, then there exists a continuous morphism $f : B \rightarrow D$ such that $|v(\chi_A)|$ is the second greatest element of $B/f^{-1}[1_D]$. But, we have a counter example of this.
- So, we need a notion which is weaker than continuous morphisms, to show it by the method developed by Jankov.

Pseudo continuous homomorphism

Definition

Let A and B be complete Heyting algebras, $f : A \rightarrow B$ a homomorphism of Heyting algebras, $F = f^{-1}[1_B]$ and $b = \bigvee(A \setminus F)$. Then, f is said to be *pseudo continuous*, if

$$\bigwedge \{b \rightarrow x \in F \mid x \in A\} \in F.$$

Let $a \in A$ and $a \neq 1_A$. A pseudo continuous homomorphism $f : A \rightarrow B$ is said to be a *pseudo continuous homomorphism for a* , if $|a|$ is the second greatest element of A/F and $F = A \setminus (\downarrow b)$.

Pseudo continuous homomorphism

- A pseudo continuous homomorphism $f : A \rightarrow B$ preserves all meets and joins in $A \setminus F$, where $F = \{x \in A \mid f(x) = 1_B\}$.




Figure: Pseudo continuous homomorphism

T-regular Heyting algebra

Definition

Let A be a complete Heyting algebra. An element $a \neq 1_A$ in A is said to be *T-regular*, if for any $c \in A$ with $c \not\leq a$, there exists $b \in A$ such that

- 1 $F_a = A \setminus (\downarrow b)$ is a filter of A (i.e., b is meet irreducible);
- 2 $|a|$ is the second greatest element of the quotient algebra A/F_a ;
- 3 $\bigwedge \{b \rightarrow x \in F_a \mid x \in A\} \in F_a$;
- 4 $c \in F_a$.

If every $a \in A$ but 1_A is T-regular, A is said to be T-regular.

T-regular Heyting algebra

- For any $a \not\leq c$, there is a prime filter F such that $a \notin F$, $c \in F$ and the projection $p: A \rightarrow A/F$ preserves all meets and joins in $A \setminus F$.




Figure: T-regular algebra

Main theorem

Theorem

Let A be a subdirectly irreducible complete Heyting algebra and β the second greatest element of A . Suppose B is a complete T-regular Heyting algebra. Then, the following two conditions are equivalent:

- ① *There exists a complete Heyting algebra D , a continuous monomorphism $e : A \rightarrow D$ and a pseudo continuous epimorphism $f : B \rightarrow D$ for some $\bar{\beta} \in f^{-1}[\{e(\beta)\}]$.*
- ② *$B \not\equiv \chi_A$.*