

Introducing open games

Jules Hedges

Neil Ghani


Joint work with
Viktor Winschel

Philipp Zahn

University of Oxford

February 24, 2017

Motivation: powerful machinery vs. hard problems



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- “Local view” of rationality: players act to maximise payoff
- “Global view”: equilibrium strategies

Example: penalty shootout



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Nash's theorem generalises this situation

Example: the \$\$\$ auction



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- Ordinary games do not compose/scale

The fundamental headache of social science

Beliefs have causal effects

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- Consequence: can easily change one component in a large structure
- **All** reasoning is by structural induction on composition

Examples of compositional systems

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- Economic systems

The compositionality hypothesis

If a theory is compositional, then reasoning with it is scalable

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Hypothesis

*Compositionality is the **only way** to be scalable*

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In programming languages it is harmed by:

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- Mutable global state
- Inheritance
- Type classes *a la* Haskell

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More generally:

- Leaky abstractions
- Emergent behaviour

Compositionality via symmetric monoidal categories (1)

Objects (aka. interfaces, types,
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Compound object $X_1 \otimes X_2$



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


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
Monoidal product (aka. tensor product, simultaneous/spatial composition)

$f_1 \otimes f_2 : X_1 \otimes X_2 \rightarrow Y_1 \otimes Y_2$




Compositionality via symmetric monoidal categories (2)

Categorical composition (aka. sequential/temporal composition) $g \circ f : X \rightarrow Z$



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


$$f : I \rightarrow X \otimes Y$$

$$g : X \rightarrow Z$$

$$h : X \otimes Z \rightarrow I$$

$$h \circ \sigma_{Z,X} \circ (g \otimes Y) \circ f : I \rightarrow I$$



Open games

A **closed game** consists of:

- A set Σ of **strategy profiles**
- A **best response** function $\mathbf{B} : \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Sigma)$

An **open game**


$$\mathcal{G} : (X, S) \rightarrow (Y, R)$$

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
- A set Σ of strategy profiles
- A **play function** $\mathbf{P}_{\mathcal{G}} : \Sigma \times X \rightarrow Y$
- A **coplay function** $\mathbf{C}_{\mathcal{G}} : \Sigma \times X \times R \rightarrow S$
- A best response function

$$\mathbf{B}_{\mathcal{G}} : X \times (Y \rightarrow R) \times \Sigma \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Sigma)$$

Bimatrix game



Perfect information game



Imperfect information

